LE Paper 2 · Topic 7
Market misconduct and improper trading practices
Topic 7 asks what a responsible officer must recognise and prevent: the six forms of market misconduct, the two routes the SFO gives for them (civil proceedings before the Market Misconduct Tribunal or criminal prosecution, never both for the same conduct), and what each route can do to a person. It then turns to the conduct rules a firm enforces on its own staff: no deals from cold calls except with exempt persons, clients first in order handling, no front running or churning. It ends with how the SFC punishes failures: the Disciplinary Fining Guidelines under the SFO and the AMLO, and its investigation, restriction and court powers. Most questions turn on one figure or one boundary: 5 years or 15 years, HK$200,000 or HK$1 million, 28 days or 7 days, civil or criminal standard.
21 min read7 sections
Checked as at 12 November 2026: e-Legislation, Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) ss.174, 182-184, 187, 193-194, 196, 198-199, 201, 204-205, 207, 213-214, 217, 245, 251-253, 257-259, 266, 270-279, 281, 283, 303, 305, 307, 388 and Sch. 9; Securities and Futures (Unsolicited Calls - Exclusion) Rules (Cap. 571A) rr.2-3; Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (Cap. 615) ss.21, 23; Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) Sch. 8. SFC: Disciplinary Fining Guidelines under the SFO (August 2018) and under AMLO s.23(1) (July 2018); Disciplinary Proceedings at a Glance (October 2020); Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the SFC (33rd edition, January 2026) General Principles and paras 3.1-3.5, 7.1, 9.1-9.3, 12.2, 12.5, 15.1, 15.4-15.5; Fund Manager Code of Conduct (5th edition, October 2024) paras 2.1.1, 3.5, 3.9, 3.10. Independent prep, not endorsed by HKSI Institute or the SFC.
Must-know for the exam
- Six forms of market misconduct: insider dealing, false trading, price rigging, prohibited-transaction disclosure, false or misleading information, stock market manipulation (SFO s.245(1), ss.270-278; criminal twins ss.291-299).
- The Tribunal: a judge chairs with 2 members who are not public officers; civil standard of proof; the SFC needs the Secretary for Justice's consent to start proceedings (SFO s.251, s.252(7), s.252A).
- One route per conduct: no Tribunal case once a Part XIV prosecution is pending or concluded (s.283); no Part XIV prosecution after consented Tribunal proceedings (s.307).
- Tribunal orders: disqualification and cold-shoulder up to 5 years, cease and desist, disgorgement with compound interest, costs. Breach of the first three: HK$1 million and 2 years (SFO s.257, s.259).
- Part XIV offences: HK$10 million fine and 10 years' imprisonment on indictment; HK$1 million and 3 years on summary conviction (SFO s.303(1)).
- Unsolicited call breach: level 5 fine (HK$50,000); the client may rescind within 28 days of the agreement or 7 days of awareness, whichever is earlier (SFO s.174(5)-(6)).
- SFC disciplinary fine: up to the greater of HK$10 million or 3 times profit gained or loss avoided, possibly per affected person (SFO s.194(2); Disciplinary Fining Guidelines, August 2018).
- AMLO s.21: public reprimand, remedial order, penalty up to the greater of HK$10 million or 3 times profit or costs avoided, plus up to HK$100,000 a day for ignoring a remedial order.
- Investigation offences: failing to attend or answer, HK$200,000 and 1 year on indictment; knowingly false answers, HK$1 million and 2 years (SFO s.184(1)-(2)).
- Section 214: the SFC may petition the court over misconduct in a listed company's affairs; directors can be disqualified for up to 15 years (SFO s.214(2)(d)).
On this page · 7 sections
Two routes: Market Misconduct Tribunal or criminal court
Part XIII of the SFO makes the six forms of market misconduct civil wrongs that the SFC takes to the Market Misconduct Tribunal. Part XIV makes the same conduct criminal offences tried in the courts. The SFC investigates either way; the difference is the forum, the standard of proof and what the forum can order.
| Point | Market Misconduct Tribunal (Part XIII) | Criminal court (Part XIV) |
|---|---|---|
| Who starts it | The SFC, by written notice to the Tribunal, with the Secretary for Justice's consent (s.252(1)-(2), s.252A) | The Secretary for Justice; the SFC may prosecute summary cases itself before a magistrate (s.388) |
| Standard of proof | Civil: balance of probabilities (s.252(7)) | Criminal: beyond reasonable doubt |
| Who can be found liable | The perpetrator, an officer whose consent or connivance let a corporation do it, and anyone who knowingly assisted (s.252(4)) | Whoever commits the offence |
| Fine or prison | No | Yes (s.303) |
Consent and the bar on a second case. The Secretary for Justice may withhold consent to Tribunal proceedings only while a Part XIV prosecution for the same conduct is contemplated, or while another indictable case would be seriously prejudiced (s.252A(2)). Once Part XIV proceedings have been instituted and are pending or cannot lawfully be brought again, no Tribunal proceedings may follow (s.283). Once consented Tribunal proceedings have been instituted, no Part XIV prosecution may follow (s.307(1)); the bar does not protect proceedings started without consent (s.307(2)). Consent does not stop prosecution for offences outside Part XIV, such as forgery, arising from the same conduct (s.252A(3)).
- •Make-up: a chairman who is a judge, appointed by the Chief Executive on the Chief Justice's recommendation for a 3-year term or a specified case, and 2 ordinary members appointed by the Chief Executive who are not public officers (s.251(2)-(3); Sch. 9 paras 2-5).
- •Decisions: questions of law by the chairman alone; every other question by majority (Sch. 9 para 24).
- •Sittings: in public unless the Tribunal decides the interests of justice require a private sitting (Sch. 9 para 26).
- •Presenting Officer: a counsel or solicitor appointed by the SFC, who must put before the Tribunal the evidence available to the SFC that will let it reach an informed decision (s.251(4)-(5); Sch. 9 para 21).
- •Evidence: the Tribunal may receive material a court would not admit, summon witnesses and take evidence on oath (s.253(1)). Ignoring its requirements or disrupting a sitting is an offence: HK$1 million and 2 years on indictment (s.253(2)-(3)). Self-incrimination is no excuse (s.253(4)).
- •Fairness: nobody may be identified as having engaged in market misconduct, or have an order made against them, without a reasonable opportunity of being heard (s.252(6), s.257(3)).
Trap: treating the routes as a sequence. The SFC cannot run a Tribunal case after a prosecution for the same conduct, or prosecute under Part XIV after consented Tribunal proceedings. It picks one, usually by the strength of its evidence.
Worked example
Which route fits the evidence?
- The SFC can show it is more likely than not that a responsible officer knowingly helped a client's false trading, but not beyond reasonable doubt.
- A prosecution would fail on the standard of proof.
- The Tribunal uses the civil standard and can identify a knowing assister under s.252(4)(c).
The Tribunal route, with the Secretary for Justice's consent.
Takeaway: Tribunal: civil standard, SFC with consent, judge plus 2 lay members, no fines. Court: criminal standard, fines and prison. One route per conduct.
The six forms of market misconduct
Section 245(1) of the SFO lists six forms. Each civil form in ss.270-278 has a criminal twin in ss.291-299 with matching defences. Breaching the Part XIVA duty to disclose inside information is a separate regime, also heard by the Tribunal, and is not market misconduct.
| Form (civil section) | Core of it | Products |
|---|---|---|
| Insider dealing (s.270) | A connected person, a take-over offeror or a knowing tippee deals, counsels or procures dealing, or tips, on inside information | Listed securities and their derivatives, including those of a related corporation |
| False trading (s.274) | Intending, or reckless as to, a false or misleading appearance of active trading, market or price; or an artificial price | Securities and futures |
| Price rigging (s.275) | A wash sale that affects price; or a fictitious or artificial transaction or device, intending or reckless as to the price effect | Securities; futures only through a fictitious or artificial device |
| Disclosure of information about prohibited transactions (s.276) | Spreading word that a price will move because of a prohibited transaction that you or an associate carried out, or that you are paid for spreading | Securities and futures |
| Disclosure of false or misleading information inducing transactions (s.277) | Information false or misleading as to a material fact, likely to induce dealing or move a price, where you know or are reckless or negligent | Securities and futures |
| Stock market manipulation (s.278) | 2 or more transactions that move or hold a price, intended to induce others to deal | Securities only |
- •Tippees: a person who received inside information directly or indirectly from someone he knows is connected, and knows or has reason to believe held it because of that connection, is caught when he deals (s.270(1)(e)). A chain of tippees does not break the link.
- •Overseas venues: counselling or tipping someone who will deal in the listed securities outside Hong Kong on a stock market that is not a recognised stock market is still insider dealing (s.270(2)).
- •Wash trades and matched orders on a market are presumed false trading unless the person shows that creating a false appearance was not among his purposes (s.274(5)-(6)); off-market transactions are outside the presumption.
- •Chinese wall defence: a corporation must show the decision-makers did not have the information, that arrangements existed to keep it from them and stop holders advising them, and that it in fact did not reach them and no such advice was given (s.271(2)(a)-(c)).
- •Disclosure defence: a paid disseminator escapes if the benefit did not come from the manipulator or an associate, or if he acted in good faith up to and including the time of the disclosure (s.276(2)).
- •Publisher defence: only a business whose principal purpose is issuing material provided by others, which did not devise, select or alter the contents and did not know they were false (s.277(2)). Re-transmitters and live broadcasters have similar defences (s.277(3)-(4)).
Trap: applying the criminal mental element to the civil form. Negligence is enough for s.277 before the Tribunal; s.298 needs knowledge or recklessness. And stock market manipulation needs at least 2 transactions: one large trade is not enough.
Worked example
The careless research report
- A licensed corporation's analysts publish a report saying a listed company has won a contract it has only bid for. Nobody checked. The price rises 12%.
- The statement is false as to a material fact and likely to induce purchases.
- The firm wrote it, so the s.277(2) publisher defence is not available.
- Carelessness is negligence, which s.277 covers.
Disclosure of false or misleading information before the Tribunal; not a s.298 offence unless knowledge or recklessness is proved.
Takeaway: Six forms, civil ss.270-278, criminal ss.291-299. Manipulation needs 2+ trades and intent; false information can be negligent before the Tribunal.
Consequences: Tribunal orders, criminal penalties and civil claims
The Tribunal cannot fine or imprison anyone for market misconduct. Under s.257(1) it can make one or more of these orders against a person it identifies, and under s.258 against an officer whose breach of the s.279 duty to keep safeguards led to a corporation's misconduct.
| Order | Tribunal (s.257(1)) | Criminal court after conviction (s.303(2)) |
|---|---|---|
| Disqualification as director or manager of a listed or specified corporation | Up to 5 years | Up to 5 years |
| Cold-shoulder: no dealing in securities, futures, leveraged FX or CIS interests in Hong Kong without leave | Up to 5 years | Up to 5 years |
| Cease and desist from specified market misconduct, whether or not the same form | Yes, no time limit | No |
| Pay the Government up to the profit gained or loss avoided | Yes, plus compound interest from the date of the misconduct at the judgment debt rate (s.259) | Yes |
| Costs to the Government, the SFC (including pre-proceedings investigation) or the AFRC | Yes | Not under s.303(2) |
| Recommend disciplinary action by the person's regulator or professional body | Yes | Yes |
| Fine and imprisonment | No | HK$10 million and 10 years on indictment; HK$1 million and 3 years summarily (s.303(1)) |
- •Tribunal orders take effect when the person is notified or at the time stated in the notice, whichever is later (s.257(8)). The SFC may tell licensed persons and registered institutions about a cold-shoulder order (s.257(9)).
- •Breaching a Tribunal disqualification, cold-shoulder or cease-and-desist order is an offence: HK$1 million and 2 years on indictment, level 6 (HK$100,000) and 6 months summarily (s.257(10)). Costs orders are not covered. Court orders under s.303(2)(a)-(b) carry the same penalty (s.303(7)).
- •A Tribunal finding can be followed by SFC discipline under s.194 after a hearing opportunity; the one-route rule applies only between Tribunal and Part XIV proceedings.
Private civil claims. Anyone who suffers pecuniary loss as a result of market misconduct may sue the perpetrator, an officer who consented or connived, or a knowing assister, whether or not the claimant dealt at an affected price, if liability is fair, just and reasonable (s.281(1)-(3)). No Tribunal proceedings or finding are needed (s.281(5)); a subsisting Tribunal finding is admissible and taken as proved unless the contrary is shown (s.281(7)-(8)). Section 305 gives the same right for Part XIV contraventions, with the criminal defences available and no conviction needed (s.305(3)-(4)).
Worked example
Sentencing a price rigger
- A trader is convicted on indictment under s.296 and made HK$3 million.
- Maximum fine and prison: HK$10 million and 10 years (s.303(1)(a)).
- Extra orders: disqualification and cold-shoulder up to 5 years each, and payment to the Government of up to HK$3 million (s.303(2)).
A HK$30 million fine (3 times profit) is wrong: that formula belongs to SFC discipline, not criminal sentencing.
Trap: expecting the Tribunal to fine, or the criminal fine to be 3 times profit. The Tribunal strips gains; the court fines up to a fixed HK$10 million.
Takeaway: Tribunal: 5-year bans, cease and desist, disgorgement plus interest, costs. Court: HK$10 million and 10 years. Investors sue under s.281 or s.305.
Unsolicited calls
Section 174 of the SFO stops an intermediary or its representative, during or because of an unsolicited call made in Hong Kong or elsewhere, from making or offering an agreement for the person called to buy or sell securities, futures or leveraged FX contracts, to provide securities margin financing, or to provide returns from those products, or from inducing the person to enter one (s.174(1)). A call is a visit in person or a communication by any means; it is unsolicited unless made at the person's express invitation, and giving out contact details is not by itself an invitation (s.174(7)).
| Who may be called (s.174(2)) | Condition |
|---|---|
| Professional investors | None, but the Code still applies (Code para 15.1(b)) |
| Existing clients | A client contract made within the past 3 years and still in force, or a regulated-activity service provided within the past 3 years (s.174(7)) |
| Licensed persons, registered institutions, money lenders | None |
| Solicitors and certified public accountants | Acting in their professional capacity |
The Securities and Futures (Unsolicited Calls - Exclusion) Rules (Cap. 571A) take three more cases outside s.174: an agreement to sell a corporation's securities to, or buy them from, a person who already holds that corporation's securities (r.3(1)); a permissible communication, meaning one not made by a visit, a phone call or other live dialogue (r.3(2)(a), (3)); and a registered institution's leveraged FX call made in line with the Monetary Authority's guideline (r.3(2)(b)). In deciding whether a communication is a live dialogue, identical terms to several recipients, a record the recipient can refer to later and no need for an immediate reply all point to a permissible communication (r.3(4)).
A breach is an offence with a level 5 fine, HK$50,000 (s.174(5); Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) Sch. 8). The person called may rescind by written notice within 28 days after the agreement or 7 days after becoming aware of the breach, whichever is earlier, subject to a later good-faith purchaser's rights (s.174(6)).
Worked example
Working out the rescission deadline
- Agreement made after a prohibited cold call: 3 June 2026.
- 28 days after the agreement: 1 July 2026.
- Client learns of the breach on 25 June 2026; 7 days later: 2 July 2026.
The earlier date governs: written notice by 1 July 2026.
1. A broker cold-calls a man whose account it closed 4 years ago and who has had no service since. Is he an existing client?
No. Existing-client status needs a contract or a regulated-activity service within the past 3 years (s.174(7)).
2. A firm emails the same fund promotion to 5,000 people; no reply is needed and they can keep it. Does s.174 catch it?
Most likely not. Identical terms, a record the recipient keeps and no need to reply all point to a permissible communication, which Cap. 571A r.3(2)(a), (3)-(4) takes outside s.174.
3. What is the maximum penalty for breaching s.174?
A level 5 fine, HK$50,000 (s.174(5)).
Trap: thinking a closed account ends existing-client status. A regulated-activity service within the past 3 years is enough on its own.
Takeaway: No deals from cold calls except with exempt persons or under Cap. 571A. Rescind within 28 days or 7 days of awareness, whichever is earlier.
Improper trading practices
Improper trading practices are ways staff put themselves or the firm ahead of clients. Most breach the Code of Conduct or the Fund Manager Code of Conduct rather than a specific SFO offence, so the consequence is SFC discipline for misconduct or lack of fitness and properness (s.193, s.194). A responsible officer is expected to have controls that detect them.
| Practice | What it looks like | Rule broken |
|---|---|---|
| Front running | Dealing for yourself, the firm or another client ahead of a pending client order to profit from its impact | Code paras 9.1 (client priority) and 9.3 (procedures to stop front running and dealing on non-public price-sensitive information); FMCC para 3.10(c) for house accounts |
| Unfair allocation | Giving a partial fill to the house first, or leaving a client fill unallocated and later booking it to a related account | Code paras 3.3 (prompt and fair allocation) and 9.2 (client priority in aggregated orders) |
| Withholding orders | Holding back an executable market or limit order for your own convenience | Code para 3.5 |
| Churning | Trading a client account or fund excessively to generate commission | FMCC para 3.5 (consider the fund's objectives, do not trade excessively); Code General Principles 1 and 6 |
| Unauthorised discretionary trading | Trading without the client's specific instruction or written discretionary authority | Code para 7.1: written authority, annual confirmation, senior management approval of the account |
| Wash trades and matched orders | Trades with no change in beneficial ownership, or pre-matched with an associate | Market misconduct: s.274(5), s.275 and their Part XIV twins |
- •Staff dealing controls (Code para 12.2): a written policy setting the conditions for staff dealing; staff report related accounts, including minor children's accounts and accounts they have a beneficial interest in; staff generally deal through the firm; duplicate confirmations to senior management if they deal elsewhere; separate records; monitoring by senior management with no interest in the trades.
- •Fund manager personal dealing (FMCC para 2.1.1): holdings disclosed on joining and at least half-yearly; prior written permission valid for no more than 5 trading days; no dealing on a day the firm has a pending order in the same investment; no dealing within 1 trading day before (if aware) or after fund trading or a recommendation; no cross trades with funds; minimum 30-day holding unless approved.
- •Reporting clients (Code para 12.5(f)): a firm must report to the SFC immediately any material breach of the market misconduct provisions it reasonably suspects a client has committed, with particulars and documents.
Trap: treating front running as insider dealing. Front running misuses knowledge of a pending client order and is a Code breach; insider dealing misuses inside information about a listed company.
Worked example
Spotting a diverted fill
- A dealer buys 50,000 shares for a client at 10.05 am and leaves the fill unallocated.
- The price rises. He books the 10.05 am fill to his sister's account.
- He then buys the client's shares again at the higher price.
Breach of prompt and fair allocation (para 3.3), client priority (para 9.1) and honesty (General Principle 1). The client paid more than he should have.
Takeaway: Clients first: in turn, ahead of staff, first in partial fills, booked promptly. No front running, churning or unauthorised trades; report suspected client manipulation immediately.
SFC Disciplinary Fining Guidelines (SFO and AMLO)
The SFC may fine a regulated person under s.194(2) or s.196(2) of the SFO up to the greater of HK$10 million or 3 times the profit gained or loss avoided. Section 199 says it may do so only after publishing guidelines and must have regard to them, which must cover whether the conduct was intentional, reckless or negligent, damaged market integrity, caused loss or costs to others, and benefited anyone. The current SFO guidelines date from August 2018. A fine is paid within 30 days after the decision takes effect (s.194(4)).
- •A fine is a more severe sanction than a reprimand; the SFC will not fine where only a public reprimand is warranted, and publicises all fining decisions.
- •Several culpable acts can attract several penalties, and the SFC may use the number of affected persons as a multiplier, for example up to HK$10 million for each client a product was mis-sold to.
- •The fine is not automatically linked to profit; 3 times profit is an alternative maximum, not a target.
- •More serious: intentional or reckless conduct, damage to market integrity, loss or costs to others, benefit to the firm or anyone else. Less serious: negligence (still fineable), purely technical breaches with little harm, little or no benefit.
- •Specific considerations include duration and frequency, how widespread the conduct is in the industry, breach of fiduciary duty, serious or systematic control weaknesses, prior SFC guidance, self-reporting, cooperation, remediation and compensation, disciplinary record, and an individual's experience and position.
- •A fine should not put the person in financial jeopardy, unless they created that appearance by moving assets. Successful civil claims may reduce the part of a fine meant to strip the benefit.
The AMLO version. For breaches of the customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements in Schedule 2 to the AMLO, s.21 lets the SFC publicly reprimand a financial institution, order remedial action by a set date, and impose a penalty up to the greater of HK$10 million or 3 times the profit gained or costs avoided. Ignoring a remedial order can add a daily penalty of up to HK$100,000 (s.21(4)). The SFC's AMLO fining guidelines (July 2018, made under s.23(1)) mirror the SFO version and add three factors: damage to Hong Kong's reputation as an international financial centre, conduct that facilitates or increases money laundering or terrorist financing risk, and whether the conduct facilitated or occasioned an offence.
| Point | SFO (s.194(2), s.199) | AMLO (s.21, s.23) |
|---|---|---|
| Who | Regulated persons: licensed persons, responsible officers, those involved in management | Financial institutions |
| Reprimand | Public or private | Public only |
| Maximum penalty | Greater of HK$10 million or 3 times profit gained or loss avoided | Greater of HK$10 million or 3 times profit gained or costs avoided |
| Daily penalty | None | Up to HK$100,000 a day for not completing ordered remedial action |
Worked example
Using the multiplier
- A firm mis-sells a product to 4 clients and earns HK$1 million.
- Cap per contravention: greater of HK$10 million or HK$3 million, so HK$10 million.
- Using the 4 affected clients as the multiplier: 4 x HK$10 million.
Up to HK$40 million, though the SFC checks the total is proportionate.
Trap: reading 3 times profit as a minimum or the usual fine. It is an alternative ceiling; the HK$10 million cap applies whenever it is greater.
Takeaway: Cap: HK$10 million or 3 times profit, possibly per victim. Intent, harm and benefit raise it; cooperation and remediation lower it.
SFC enforcement powers and why the SFC acts
The SFC acts to protect investors and market integrity and to deter non-compliance. Typical reasons for action against intermediaries are dishonesty and misuse of client assets, failures of supervision and internal control, anti-money laundering failures, unsuitable recommendations, and failures to detect or report market misconduct. Its tools range from investigation through discipline to court action.
| Power | What it does | Key limit or penalty |
|---|---|---|
| Investigation (s.182, s.183) | Directs staff to investigate suspected offences, market misconduct, misconduct or unfitness; requires documents, explanations, attendance and answers | No excuse for self-incrimination (s.184(4)), but a prior claim makes answers inadmissible in most criminal cases (s.187) |
| Investigation offences (s.184) | Failing to produce, attend or answer without reasonable excuse; knowingly or recklessly giving false information | HK$200,000 and 1 year on indictment; false information HK$1 million and 2 years; with intent to defraud, 7 years |
| Discipline (s.194, s.196) | Revoke or suspend a licence or registration, revoke or suspend responsible officer approval, reprimand, prohibit, fine | Reasonable opportunity to be heard first (s.198(1)); review by the Securities and Futures Appeals Tribunal within 21 days (s.217(3)) |
| Restriction notices (ss.204-207) | SFC notice restricting a licensed corporation's business or its dealing with property | Grounds in s.207, such as risk of dissipation or unfitness |
| Court orders (s.213) | Injunctions, orders to restore parties, freezing property, appointing an administrator, declaring contracts void or voidable, damages | Made by the Court of First Instance, which must find the order desirable and not unfairly prejudicial |
| Listed company remedies (s.214) | Petition over oppression, fraud, misfeasance or withholding information from members | Director disqualification up to 15 years |
- •Supervisors are exposed: a licensed corporation's misconduct that occurs with a responsible officer's consent or connivance, or is attributable to his neglect, is also his misconduct (s.193(2)).
- •Process: the SFC sends a notice of proposed disciplinary action, normally allows 30 days for written representations, then issues a decision notice with reasons (SFC Disciplinary Proceedings at a Glance, October 2020; s.198(3)).
- •Settlement: by agreement and in the public interest, the SFC may exercise any Part IX power, including one different from the one first proposed, and take additional action; with the person's agreement the hearing requirement falls away (s.201(3)-(4)).
- •Summary prosecutions: the SFC may prosecute offences under the relevant provisions in its own name before a magistrate (s.388).
Trap: assuming the SFC can do everything itself. Restriction notices and discipline are SFC decisions; injunctions, administrators, voiding contracts and s.214 disqualifications need the Court of First Instance.
Takeaway: Investigate, discipline, restrict, then go to court. Ignoring red flags makes the responsible officer liable too; s.214 bans run to 15 years.
Traps that cost marks
- Assuming any Tribunal case blocks prosecution. The bar is tied to the Secretary for Justice's consent, which is how the criminal route is protected.
- Thinking the SFC picks the Tribunal. The SFC brings the case and appoints the Presenting Officer; the Chief Executive appoints the Tribunal.
- Treating consent as a general discretion. Section 252A(2) limits refusal to protecting a contemplated or pending criminal case.
- Reading the dual-track bar as covering every crime. It covers only the Part XIV twin of the market misconduct.
- Carrying the criminal standard of proof into Tribunal proceedings. The Tribunal is civil and decides on the balance of probabilities (s.252(7)).
- Assuming only the trader can be pursued. Officers who consent or connive and anyone who knowingly assists can be identified too.
- Thinking an overseas venue takes the dealing outside the SFO. Section 270(2) closes that gap for counselling and tipping.
- Thinking any payment from the manipulator is fatal. Good faith up to the time of disclosure is a defence even then.
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Exam-style questions
- Tribunal proceedings against Wendy Kwan for price rigging were instituted without the Secretary for Justice's consent under s.252A(1) of the SFO. The Department of Justice now wants to prosecute her under Part XIV for the same conduct. Does s.307 bar the prosecution?
- Paul Yip faces Market Misconduct Tribunal proceedings for price rigging, instituted by the SFC with the Secretary for Justice's consent. Police later find that, in the same scheme, he forged bank documents, an offence under the Crimes Ordinance. Which statement is correct?
- The SFC's evidence that Lydia Chan, a responsible officer, knowingly helped a client carry out false trading would satisfy the balance of probabilities but probably not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Which route gives the SFC the best prospect of a finding against her?
- Henry Lau, a director of Bayside Holdings Ltd, whose shares are listed on SEHK and also traded on an overseas stock market that is not a recognised stock market, knows of unannounced poor results. He urges a friend to sell Bayside shares on that overseas market. Is this insider dealing under the SFO?